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1. Introduction 
Linguistics research is filled with observations such as the following: ‘There are three 
green books on the table’ is an acceptable sentence, but ‘There are green three books on the 
table’ is not. Such judgments—as well as judgments about co-reference, ambiguity, 
pronounceability, and more—form a significant part of the evidence base for linguistics. This is 
in large measure due to Chomsky, whose work has exemplified the fruitfulness of such evidence 
and whose Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965, chapter 1) is a locus classicus for 
theorizing about their status. The prominence of judgment data in contemporary linguistics is 
crucially tied to Chomsky’s mentalist reconception of the field. 
Judgment data were not completely absent prior to Chomsky’s work. For example, field 
linguists did not always prescind from asking informants whether such-and-such was something 
they would say, and Chomsky’s teacher Zelig Harris emphasized the importance for phonology 
of speakers’ judgments concerning sound differences (Harris 1951). But the positivist, 
behaviorist, and structuralist positions that dominated American linguistics in the first half of the 
20th century tended to view the use of judgment data with suspicion and focused rather on 
produced sentences. 
The methodological strictures in part arose in reaction to problems encountered in earlier 
introspectionist psychology (discussed in section 3). But the focus on produced utterances 
reflected as well a particular conception of what languages are and thus what linguistics is about. 
Though linguists of this period differed in many ways, they shared a tendency to view languages 
as consisting in the totality of utterances speakers of that language can produce (an E-language in 
Chomsky’s (1986) terminology); and much work focused on describing, analyzing, and 
taxonomizing languages so conceived—for example, the many Native American languages so 
apparently different from the Indo-European languages which were then more familiar to 
linguists. While such a conception does not of itself preclude the use of speakers’ judgments (cf. 
the remarks on Devitt’s (2006) views in section 2), it is more naturally combined with an 
emphasis on corpus data, especially given the methodological scruples already mentioned. 
Conversely, judgment data find a natural home in Chomsky’s mentalist reconception of 
linguistics—a reconception, according to Chomsky (1966), that is in fact a recovery and 
development of earlier ideas about language. On this approach, linguistics aims, not just to 
describe linguistic products, but to provide a cognitive explanation of various of their distinctive 
features. One of Chomsky’s core hypotheses is that there is an innately constrained 
computational procedure realized in the mind-brain—so-called I-language—that is implicated 
specifically in linguistic phenomena and whose character explains some of their distinctive 
features. As with aspects of our cognition more generally, we cannot directly observe I-language 
but must infer it from the effects to which it contributes. The methodological claim relevant to 
this chapter is that judgment data prove particularly useful in this endeavor. 
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This is so for several reasons. First, judgment tasks allow linguists to collect data 
concerning items that rarely show up in a corpus of actually produced speech—for example, 
perfectly fine sentences that are structurally a bit complex. Such sentences have proven useful 
for investigating particular phenomena and hypotheses. Judgment tasks, like any experiment, 
thus allow linguists to draw upon data beyond what happens to occur naturally without 
intervention. Second, relatedly, judgment tasks can provide negative evidence regarding items 
that do not appear in the corpus specifically because they violate I-language constraints. Mere 
absence from a corpus can occur for any number of reasons. A judgment of unacceptability 
provides stronger evidence of ungrammaticality—insofar as reasonable alternative explanations 
can be ruled out (pragmatic oddity, processing difficulties, memory constraints, lexical 
awkwardness, etc.). This points to a third reason judgment data have proven useful. One can 
systematically vary the items presented in judgment tasks in ways that control for competing 
explanations. An inference back to the judgment’s cause may then plausibly isolate features of I-
language from among the various interacting aspects of cognition responsible for the judgment. 
There is no claim that in principle only judgment data can serve this purpose. Indeed, in 
early work (Chomsky 1955/1975, pp. 101-3), Chomsky looked for behavioral measures that 
might serve instead. But as the efficiency and fruitfulness of judgment data became evident, they 
became the central source of evidence in theoretical syntax—a status they have retained, even as 
the evidential base of linguistics has broadened. Nevertheless, despite their success in allowing 
interesting phenomena to be identified, important questions to be raised, and substantial 
hypotheses to be tested, the use of judgment data in linguistics has attracted controversy from the 
start and continues to do so (e.g., Branigan and Pickering 2017)—in a way that the analogous use 
of judgment data in vision science does not. 
After first looking more closely at what judgment data are and how they are supposed to 
provide evidence for linguistic hypotheses, we shall examine these objections, including recent 
attempts to address some of them experimentally. The research canvassed is part of a movement 
in recent decades to gather and analyze judgment data more formally than had been typical. We 
close by surveying some of the new paths this work has opened up.
 
2. What they are 
Judgment data are meta-linguistic judgments—judgments about specific linguistic items, 
construed broadly to include language-like items (e.g., ungrammatical strings). Linguists advert 
to a wide variety of meta-linguistic judgments. We have already mentioned judgments about 
acceptability, co-reference, ambiguity, and pronounceability, but there are plenty more: 
judgments about truth-value, entailment, frequency of use, etc. Moreover, within these types, the 
judgments may be expressed in a variety of ways. As explained below, subjects may be asked to 
rate a sentence’s acceptability on a Likert scale, for example, or to provide a magnitude 
estimation, or to express preferability by performing a forced choice among multiple sentences. 
But not all meta-linguistic judgments are used as evidence: that ‘I wonder what who saw’ 
(but not ‘I wonder who saw what’) violates the Superiority condition is a meta-linguistic 
judgment, but one invoked in linguistic theorizing to explain data, not as a datum itself. Other 
cases can be less obvious—notably, judgments of (un)grammaticality. It was once common for 
linguists to advert to such judgments as evidence, but now they do so far less frequently. This in 
part reflects the use of ‘grammar’ as a technical term for I-language, so that a ‘judgment about 
grammaticality’ in that sense refers to a proposed explanation of evidence (cf. Chomsky 1965, p. 
 3 
11, on acceptability vs. grammaticality). When linguists serve as their own subjects, there is a 
particular risk of not clearly distinguishing explanans and explanandum.  
What then distinguishes meta-linguistic judgments of the kind used as evidence? In fact, 
it is not clear that there is an informative general answer that captures all and only the relevant 
cases. But canvassing some candidates helps nonetheless bring out some central, typical features. 
One answer is that such judgments are in some sense intuitive; and indeed the judgments 
used as evidence are sometimes referred to as linguistic intuitions. Some linguists eschew this 
label, perhaps owing to unwanted suggestions not encouraged by the more neutral term 
‘judgment data’—for example, that subjects have a special intuitive faculty that provides them 
access to the causes of their judgment (in particular, their I-language), or that hunches about the 
causes of judgment may serve as useful data. Another reason could be that it is none too easy to 
spell out the intended sense of ‘intuitive’ in a way that captures the judgment data that linguists 
in fact use. For example, linguistic intuitions are sometimes characterized as relatively 
immediate, or unreflective, or not based on conscious inference. But it can take time and effort to 
get a reading of a sentence, and reflection and perhaps conscious inference to arrive at a truth-
judgment; experimenters may find it informative to compare rushed and considered judgments; 
and, even if a linguist developed the skill to spot and label, for example, Superiority violations 
quickly and without reflection, it is not obvious that would increase the evidentiary value of the 
resulting judgments. Still, the characteristic features of “intuitive” judgments hold of a large 
range of judgment data, and their doing so helps explain their usefulness. For a relatively 
immediate, unreflective judgment not based on reasons is more likely to reflect the character of 
I-language—the object of inquiry—rather than the subject’s beliefs about language or other 
intrusions from higher cognition. 
Judgment data are also often characterized as introspective (sometimes critically, as we 
will see). But again it is not clear this applies to all the judgments linguists use as evidence. The 
question turns in part on what is meant by ‘introspection’. On one common characterization, 
introspective judgments are non-inferential, non-exteroceptively-based judgments about one’s 
own mental states (Schwitzgebel 2019). Some judgment data may be introspective in this sense, 
as when subjects report whether a sentence sounds good. But a judgment that a sentence is 
acceptable, or an utterance true, is about the sentence or the utterance, not about one’s mental 
states concerning them.  (Compare: if I report that it is raining, the report expresses my belief, 
but both the report and my belief are about the rain, not about my belief itself, nor about my 
perception of the rain.) Talk of introspection may be cashed out in other ways—for example, 
rather than requiring a distinctive kind of internally-directed content, one might require just a 
distinctive kind of access. But it is not obvious how to do so without either collapsing the 
distinction between perceptual and introspective judgments or omitting some of the judgments 
linguists use as evidence. An example of the former would be a liberal conception of 
introspection that included any judgment immediately based on a conscious experience. An 
example of the latter would be a conception that emphasizes the need to compare similarities and 
differences across mental states (Chirimuuta 2014), which would render forced-choice 
preferences introspective, but not acceptability judgments. 
Both of these answers—in terms of intuition or introspection—involve in part an appeal 
to the etiology of the meta-linguistic judgments that serve as evidence in linguistics. Might some 
other etiological approach do the job? A problem is that the different kinds of judgment—
concerning, recall, acceptability, pronounceability, truth-value, even frequency or likelihood of 
use (Labov 1996)—draw on different cognitive capacities. From the perspective of etiology, 
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judgment data thus appear to form something of a motley. To be sure, in all cases, it is assumed 
that the etiology involves aspects of our linguistic competence. This assumption is built into the 
logic of linguists’ explanations, when they infer properties of this competence from such causal 
effects as speakers’ judgments. But I-language also figures in the etiology of many judgments 
not used as evidence in linguistics—for example, whenever one comes to believe what one is 
told. Even if we limit ourselves to just one central kind of judgment—acceptability judgments—
it is unclear that we are currently in a position to offer an informative account of their etiology, 
especially of that part of the causal story that follows upon (attempts at) parsing and 
comprehension. One natural suggestion is that the presence or absence of error signals of the sort 
hypothesized by theories of language monitoring may play a role as well in the generation of at 
least some meta-linguistic judgments (Matthews, unpublished; Sprouse 2018; Gross 2020). But 
this idea stands in need of development and empirical investigation. Moreover, it is probably not 
the full story: it is plausible that (in)comprehension also plays a role, as may feelings of effort or 
disfluency and other factors. 
It is useful here to pause briefly over two accounts of how meta-linguistic judgments 
fulfill their evidential function that provide alternatives to the dominant mentalist conception 
championed by Chomsky. These views have played a significant role in philosophical debates 
and illustrate how differing conceptions of judgment data and their evidential status are tied to 
differing conceptions of language and linguistics. But they also illustrate, more specifically, 
differing conceptions of judgment data’s etiology. 
According to Katz (1981), languages are abstract objects—akin to mathematical 
structures—with which we do not causally interact. The meta-linguistic judgments deployed in 
linguistics are thus not arrived at via perception or introspection, which would require causal 
interaction with instances of their object. Rather, we possess a faculty of intuition—the 
competence-grammar—that provides a priori access to these abstract, non-mental structures, 
including to their necessary properties. This access consists in our capacity to construct 
representations of sentences and their properties from tacit knowledge (innate and learned) of 
the grammatical principles of the language. The content of linguistic intuitions—for example, 
that some sentence S is grammatical—is thus directly supplied to judgment by this faculty. Note 
the contrast with Chomsky’s view, as I have presented it, which in no way assumes that I-
language itself issues meta-linguistic contents concerning grammaticality—or acceptability, for 
that matter.i 
 Devitt (2006), on the other hand, endorses a non-Platonist E-language conception of the 
object of linguistics. On his view, linguistics concerns the possible tokens of a language—not the 
psychology of speakers—with the tokens’ linguistic properties determined by conventions 
among speakers. These conventions do impose constraints on the psychology of a speaker if she 
is to count as a competent member of the linguistic community: she must process language in a 
way that yields outputs whose properties respect these conventions. But Devitt denies that 
satisfying this constraint requires or involves an I-language or modularized language faculty. 
Thus, contra Katz, the contents of judgment data, according to Devitt, are not the direct product 
of a language module that serves as a faculty of linguistic intuition. Nor do they provide the basis 
for an inference to the best explanation concerning the properties of I-language. They reflect, 
rather, the “central systems” knowledge that language-users have of a language after many years 
of immersion in it—just as regular interaction can lead to fairly reliable knowledge of 
surrounding flora and fauna. 
 5 
Critical discussion of these alternative conceptions of language is beyond our scope (but 
see, for example, Iten, Stainton, and Wearing 2006 on Katz, and Maynes and Gross 2013 and 
Rey 2020 on Devitt). Our point was to contrast them with the mentalist conception and thus 
indicate the range of views concerning the etiology of judgment data. It is not in general a 
condition on evidential status in the sciences that theorists possess a complete understanding of 
the etiology of data (Bogen and Woodward 1988). But further insight into the etiological 
details—in addition to its intrinsic interest and consequences for other debates in the philosophy 
of linguistics—could help address some of the worries about the use of judgment data in 
linguistics to which we now turn.  
 
3. Objections to judgment data 
We remarked that the use of judgment data has never been without critics. The objections 
have taken various forms. Earlier objections tended to deem judgments problematic as evidence 
per se, not just in linguistics but more generally. Later objections contend that the use of 
judgment data is problematic more specifically in the linguistic domain, in some cases on 
account of how they are in fact typically gathered or because of an over-reliance on them over 
other sources of evidence. No matter their scope, we limit ourselves to objections that target 
features of putative evidence that would be problematic no matter the type of scientific inquiry. 
These include failures of validity, reliability, sensitivity, or freedom from bias.ii We thus set 
aside worries that judgment data are, say, unscientific or subjective—unless cashed in these other 
terms. This accords with Chomsky’s long-standing protests against a “methodological dualism” 
that would hold the sciences of the mind to different standards regarding evidence, often based 
on extra-scientific a priori philosophical concerns (e.g., Chomsky 2000, p. 142). 
As noted in section 1, a main source of concern for linguists prior to Chomsky stemmed 
from problems encountered by introspectionist psychology. Introspection proved inadequate to 
ground a consensus on various of the main questions introspectionist psychology pursued—such 
as identifying the atoms of sensory experience and determining whether there is imageless 
thought (see Hatfield 2005). These failures led to a more general mistrust of introspection as a 
valid or reliable source of evidence—at least for settling illuminating questions (cf. Feest 2014). 
But was this generalization an instance of salutary methodological caution or an over-
generalization? Introspection may well have been unfit for the purposes to which it was put. The 
atoms of sensory experience—if there are such—may be too fine for introspection to uncover; 
and the introspective techniques deployed in the imageless thought controversy tended to target 
mental processes (about which it is widely agreed that we lack reliable introspective access) 
rather than their products. It hardly follows that introspective data in general are 
methodologically suspect—let alone that judgment data are. (Recall from section 2 that judgment 
data form a broader class than introspective judgments on some common uses of the term 
‘introspection’.) Note, in particular, that the use of judgment data in linguistics is rather different 
from their use in the introspectionist examples just mentioned: the judgments in linguistics are 
not themselves about mental processes, nor are they used to illuminate sensory experience; 
rather, they are products of a mental process aspects of which the theorist attempts to infer from 
those products. 
The attempt to generalize beyond introspectionist psychology is further blunted by a 
comparison with the use of judgment data in contemporary vision science. As with much 
judgment data in linguistics, the judgments used in vision science may be based on conscious 
experience and may even ascribe mind-dependent properties, while yet being about external 
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objects and their features, as opposed to subjects’ experience. (Though, to be sure, judgments 
about how things look or appear also play a role in vision science—for example, in work on 
color constancy.) Because such judgments are based on experience, one may reasonably infer 
something about the subject’s experience from them. But the research question driving a vision 
scientist need not concern conscious experience. As with the linguist, the vision scientist’s 
concern may be earlier aspects of the judgment’s etiology—for instance, aspects of early visual 
processing. Importantly, in vision science there are no general methodological qualms about 
using such judgments as evidence. The tremendous success of vision science provides a powerful 
reply to any general suspicion of judgment data (and, to the extent it relies on judgments that are 
deemed introspective, to any general suspicion of introspection). 
This leaves open the possibility that judgment data are invalid or unreliable in particular 
domains or in particular deployments, as they proved to be in some introspectionist psychology. 
Language differs from vision in various ways, for example in the degree and kind of individual 
variation and in the mechanisms by which processing provides material for judgments. 
Generalizing from success in one domain to success in another requires caution just as 
generalizing from failure in one domain to failure in another does. The obvious response is that 
the tremendous success of linguistics based on judgment data likewise makes a strong case for 
their appropriateness in this domain. 
Presenting this case in detail—that is, reviewing significant tracts of linguistics—is of 
course beyond our scope, but also perhaps not to the point, at least so far as more recent critics 
are concerned. For they are familiar with this work and yet their worries persist. Instead, we can 
consider how such a case could be strengthened in response to two more specific objections 
sometimes raised about the use of judgment data in linguistics. The first is that the validity and 
reliability of this data is threatened by the “informal” way the judgments are typically gathered in 
practice. Much judgment data consists in linguists reporting their own responses. It is objected 
that data collected in this manner are subject to confirmation bias, not properly controlled, and 
not amenable to statistical analysis owing to the small number of subjects (often just one!). 
Second, critics sometimes bemoan the disconnect between work in, for example, theoretical 
syntax and work in psycholinguistics and other area of cognitive science (Ferreira 2005). The 
case for judgment data in linguistics would be strengthened to the degree that other converging 
sources of evidence helped demonstrate that judgment data are in effect sufficiently “calibrated” 
to the phenomena they are used to understand. Let’s consider each of these challenges in turn. 
One strategy in response to worries concerning how judgment data are in practice 
collected is to note that the informal process of gathering judgment data actually involves more 
than this objection allows (Phillips 2009). Data that make it to print typically receive 
corroboration by seminar attendees, conference audiences, journal referees, and others—some of 
whom may be biased towards other hypotheses. As for controls, linguists often look for 
“minimal pairs”: strings that differ so far as possible only in one way relevant to the hypothesis 
in question (‘John is eager to please’ vs. ‘John is easy to please’). Even when only a single string 
is presented in a published text, many variants may also have been considered—and expert 
consumers of the publication will consider many variants as well in reflecting on what they read. 
Indeed, “informal” methods allow for the consideration of many more variants than do more 
“formal” methods involving many subjects. Finally, strong linguistic judgment data share a 
feature with the judgment reports used in vision science: readers are often in a position to readily 
judge for themselves. For example, in a highly cited paper on visual adaptation to numerosity, 
Burr and Ross (2008) reported the judgments of four subjects, two of whom were the authors. 
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While there has been debate concerning the interpretation of their results, no one has challenged 
the data: for anyone can view the figures and experience the results for themselves. Similarly, in 
linguistics, judgment data are unlikely to be taken up further in the literature if readers find the 
judgments dubious. 
There is, however, another way one can respond to worries about how judgment data are 
in-practice collected—namely, by changing how one collects data. Indeed, the last few decades 
have witnessed a significant growth in “formally” collected judgment data—judgment data 
gathered from large numbers of naïve subjects using methods common across the social sciences. 
Work in experimental syntax was catalyzed in part by the publication of Schütze (1996) and 
Cowart (1997) which laid out, and showed how to avoid, the more subtle confounds to which 
judgment data can be subject—for example, order effects, where previously considered stimuli 
affect subjects’ response to subsequent stimuli. (For an example of how order effects can be 
relevant to judgments that serve as evidence for Binding Theory, see Gordon and Hendrick 
1997.) Formal experiments are not themselves immune to methodological pitfalls; no process of 
gathering data is (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 2010). Confounds may not be controlled for; 
undetected bias can infect results; subjects can misunderstand instructions; etc. But anticipating 
and avoiding such problems to the extent possible is at the core of experimentalists’ training; and 
their standards for reporting results are intended to facilitate the further uncovering of design 
issues and alternative interpretations. 
Not only does the use of formal methods provide a response to worries concerning 
informally gathered data, it also enables the empirical investigation of data-gathering methods 
themselves. For example, we noted earlier that subjects may in various ways attribute various 
properties to strings of words. A subject may express the acceptability of a string by rating it on a 
Likert scale or by providing a magnitude estimate. In the former case, she may select a natural 
number from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating complete unacceptability and 5 indicating full 
acceptability. In the latter case, after a numerical starting point is established with respect to an 
initial string, further strings are placed on an open-ended numerical scale in accordance with 
their judged distance in acceptability from the initial string. (More specifically, subjects are 
instructed to rate the further strings as a multiple or fraction of the initial standard—see Bard, 
Robinson, and Sorace 1996.) Among other advantages, magnitude estimation allows subjects to 
introduce as many distinctions among strings as they like. Further investigation, however, has 
suggested that, unlike with other features such as luminance in vision tasks, subjects are unable 
to judge ratios of acceptability—perhaps owing to the difficulty of establishing a zero point for 
full unacceptability (Featherston 2008). Perhaps they complete such tasks by tacitly converting 
them into a more standard rating task, similar to rating along a Likert scale (Sprouse 2011). A 
methodological inquiry like this can only be done using a more formal approach. 
Of particular interest to us is that formal methods can be used to investigate informal 
methods and thus provide yet another response to worries concerning them—now by potentially 
vindicating them, as opposed to supplying an alternative to them. For example, Sprouse and 
Almeida (2012) took all 469 strings that were provided an acceptability rating in Adger’s (2003) 
syntax textbook and tested them on 440 naïve subjects. Using conservative criteria, they found 
that 98% of the informal judgments replicated. Similarly, Sprouse, Schütze, and Almeida (2013) 
used a random sampling of 300 informal acceptability judgments drawn from papers published 
the previous decade in the journal Linguistic Inquiry to test naive subjects on three different 
judgment tasks. Again, using conservative criteria, they found that 95% of the informal 
judgments replicated. More generally, comparisons of informally and formally gathered 
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judgment data so far appear to vindicate the former, at least relative to the latter (cf. Culbertson 
and Gross 2009; Mahowald, Graff, Hartman, and Gibson 2016). It should be noted, though, that 
the work to date has concentrated on acceptability judgments in English (though cf. Linzen and 
Oseki 2018, albeit still on acceptability judgments). 
In addition to investigating consistency between informally and formally gathered 
judgments, other relevant features have been explored as well—in particular, sensitivity and bias. 
Sprouse and Almeida (2017) compared the sensitivity (the probability of detecting an effect) of 
four different judgment tasks. This speaks to the number of subjects needed to achieve statistical 
power: recall the worry that informally gathered judgments in practice involve too few subjects. 
The most sensitive task—forced-choice judgments—reached 80% power on strong effects with 
just 11 participants. As for the possibility of unconscious confirmation bias, Sprouse (2020) 
notes that one way such bias might reveal itself would be via sign reversals in a comparison 
between naïve and expert judgments—that is, cases with a change in direction between the effect 
reported by the two groups. But in fact the data reported in Sprouse, Schütze, and Almeida 
(2013) revealed very few such cases—about 1-2%—and thus little evidence for confirmation 
bias (cf. also Dabrowska 2010). 
We have suggested that there is little intrinsic reason to reject judgment data generally 
and that specific reasons for worry about linguistic judgment data based on how they are in 
practice collected can be avoided by changing those practices and in any event are perhaps no 
cause for great concern. Let’s return now to the issue of calibration and more generally of mesh 
with other methods and theoretical domains. It is a common complaint that there is an over-
reliance among linguists on judgment data—at least in theoretical syntax. This is an objection, 
specific to the linguistic domain, about how such judgments are used, not an objection to such 
data per se or to how they are in practice gathered. The other side of the coin for such over-
reliance would be a dearth of converging evidence from other sources and, in particular, a lack of 
calibration of judgment data by other methods. As a consequence, we would be permitted less 
confidence that our evidence provides an accurate measure of the domain we use it to 
investigate. 
Note that the worry pertains to what evidence linguists in practice most rely on. It is not 
claimed that linguists endorse a principled restriction of the data to meta-linguistic judgments. 
Recall Chomsky’s objection to methodological dualism. As we saw, it provides a response to 
certain methodological strictures against judgment data—those based on extra-scientific 
philosophical concerns. But it also undermines any principled restriction to judgment data. 
Linguists of course do draw upon a wide variety of evidence: corpus data, developmental 
and acquisition work, evidence from congenital and acquired deficits, etc. Some of this data—
and success in developing theories exploiting it alongside judgment data—does indeed provide a 
kind of indirect “calibration” of judgment data. But when it comes to the more fine-grained 
specifics of an individual language’s grammar, more direct calibration is difficult to find. A 
casebook example of a failure to find such calibration comes from the downfall of the 
Derivational Theory of Complexity, which unsuccessfully attempted to relate grammatical 
transformations to response times in production and comprehension (Fodor, Bever, and Garrett 
1974). Arguably, however, the source of this failure was incorrect theory, not any problem with 
the judgments on which it was based (Marantz 2005). More recent reading-time studies provide a 
more successful example of mesh between judgment data and behavioral data, and more 
generally between the methods dominant in theoretical syntax and those more typical of 
psycholinguistics. For example, Stowe (1986) found that whether reading time slows at crucial 
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junctures in sentences with filler-gap dependencies depends on whether an active filler strategy 
would violate a syntactic island constraint (see Phillips 2006 for an overview of reading-time 
studies). With the increasing use of other experimental methods and the growing rapprochement 
between theoretical syntax and psycholinguistics, there is the possibility that further sources of 
specific converging evidence will be uncovered (see Sprouse and Schütze 2020 for a discussion 
of the relations more generally among judgment data and other data). 
 
4. The future of judgment data 
Informally gathered judgments have supplied linguists with large amounts of easily-
obtained data directly relevant to their most pressing questions. A glance at leading linguistics 
journals suggest that they continue to do so—though see Marantz (2005, p. 438) for some 
skepticism on this score. Supposing that they do, and given the legitimation so far of informal 
methods by more formal inquiry, the question arises whether and when the use of formal 
methods is called for or might prove fruitful. The formal gathering and analysis of judgment 
data, after all, is not only subject to its own methodological pitfalls (mentioned above), but is 
also more time-consuming and costly—though less so than it was, owing to the advent of crowd-
sourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. We conclude by briefly remarking on a 
few possibilities. 
• One important use of formal judgment tasks has already been noted: to investigate 
differences among judgment tasks themselves. We mentioned comparisons between 
formal and informal methods and between Likert-scale ratings and magnitude 
estimations. Another example is the investigation of how varying task instructions 
can affect performance (Cowart 1997). 
• Various authors propose using formal methods to investigate strings that are hard to 
judge or where informal judgments diverge (e.g., Linzen and Oseki 2018), whether to 
settle the status of the case or to better understand the source of the divergence. For 
example, formal methods can help reveal when variability at the group level masks 
interesting clusters among sub-groups (Kush, Lohndal, and Spouse 2018, 2019). 
• It has long been recognized that acceptability is gradient; formal methods have made 
this especially clear. Some point to these results in advocating gradience in grammars 
(Sorace and Keller 2005—cf. Chomsky 1965, p. 11). But more work is required to 
determine whether gradience in acceptability reflects grammatical gradience or rather 
arises from other sources. Formal judgment tasks will no doubt play a role. 
• Indeed, formal judgment tasks, in tandem with tasks of other sorts, have been used to 
explore how aspects of processing independent of I-language may affect judgments of 
acceptability. For example, it has long been assumed that working memory 
limitations can cause a grammatical sentence to be judged unacceptable, with 
multiply center-embedded sentences providing the parade case. But efforts to 
establish further working memory effects (surveyed in Sprouse 2018) have so far 
failed to yield unequivocal results. On the other hand, there has been more success 
investigating cases—so-called ‘grammatical illusions’—where features of processing 
can cause ungrammatical sentences to be judged acceptable (Wagers, Lau, and 
Phillips 2009, Wellwood et al. 2018). 
• The work on grammatical illusions points to another emerging role for formal 
judgment data. Judgment tasks have traditionally been deployed in theoretical syntax 
to understand I-language. But formal judgment tasks are proving useful for 
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understanding questions concerning linguistic processing (Phillips et al. forthcoming). 
More generally, formal judgment tasks hold out the promise of helping linguists 
better understand the relation between “competence” and “performance”—in 
particular, between I-language and the linguistic processing that I-language is 
variously said to be a “part of”, or “embodied in”, or an “abstraction from” (cf. Lewis 
and Phillips 2015). 
Judgment data, no matter how collected, have a definite future in linguistics. That other 
methods now also play a large role is all to the good—and something in part made possible by 
the advances judgment data allowed. Hitting upon this large vein and displaying its riches is 
among Chomsky’s enduring legacies. 
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i To be fair, one can find remarks by Chomsky that suggest otherwise, as when he writes that there are mechanisms 
in the mind that permit deduction-like computations from I-language to specific judgments (Chomsky 1986, p. 270). 
I am articulating the dominant, considered view, which has emerged more clearly in part owing to these debates. 
ii These terms are used in their psychometric senses. Evidence is valid just in case it measures what it is intended to 
measure; and reliable just in case relevantly similar conditions elicit a similar response. (‘Validity’ and ‘reliability’ 
have different technical meanings in philosophy.) Sensitivity concerns the true positive rate. Reliability is necessary 
for validity, but not sufficient: reliably sinking in water was not a valid test of witchiness.  
                                               
